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ARGUMENT 
The State Ignores Important Language in Section 602(a)(24) 
At pages 16-18 of its brief, the State asserts that the plain 
language of 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(24) supports its position. The 
State reaches this conclusion, however, by focusing exclusively on 
a dictionary definition of the words "receive" and "received" while 
refusing to consider the language of section 602(a)(24) in its 
entirety. The State ignores the fact that the section is concerned 
with "the period for which such benefits are received..." 
(Emphasis added) Thus, it does not matter that the SSI benefits 
were not paid until after the DIB was paid, since the SSI was for 
the period of time starting in July 1992 when Nelson became 
eligible. The period for which SSI benefits were received overlaps 
the time when the DIB benefits were paid, thereby excluding Nelson 
from the AFDC household. 
By narrowing its focus to dictionary definitions, the State is 
able to avoid facing the unfairness of its position. In her 
opening brief, Nelson pointed out that the cancellation of her 
son's eligibility for AFDC and Medicaid was purely the result of 
the infortuitous arrival of Nelson's DIB check before the SSI 
benefit was calculated. The State does not address the fact that 
other similarly situated children whose mother's become disabled 
are allowed to continue receiving financial and health benefits, 
simply because the SSI check arrives first. It is this fundamental 
unfairness that prompted the court in Gleim v. Com. Dept. of Public 
Welfare, 409 A. 2d 951 (Pa. Cmwlth 1980) to reach the decision it 
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did, a decision which the State characterizes as employing 
"tortured reasoning." Brief of the Appellee, at 20. It is not 
tortured reasoning to recognize the illogical and inconsistent 
results that follow from the narrow approach taken by the State. 
Nelson's Argument Does Not Conflict With Congressional and Agency 
Policy 
Starting at page 18 of its brief, the State argues that to 
hold for Nelson and her son would be inconsistent with acceptable 
Congressional and agency objectives and policy concerns. The 
trouble with the State's argument is that it never points to any 
clear congressional or agency policy addressing the particular 
facts of this case. After discounting Gleim as "tortured 
reasoning," the State reviews Pennsylvania v. United States. 752 
F.2d 795 (3d Cir. 1984), a case which addresses a distinctly 
different issue in the interplay between AFDC and SSI. Moreover, 
the State ignores the important statement by the court in 
Pennsylvania v. United States that the district court's 
interpretation of section 602(a)(24) was only one possible reading 
of the statute. See discussion in Brief of Appellant, at 17-18. 
The State further errs in asserting that Nelson's position 
"carried to its logical extreme" would result in SSI applicants 
being declared ineligible for AFDC during the SSI determination 
period. The mere filing of an SSI application does not render an 
AFDC recipient ineligible. After all, the SSI disability claim may 
be denied. Once the AFDC recipient is found eligible for SSI, any 
AFDC benefits received during the determination period are offset 
against SSI benefits owed. The State's suggestion at page 22 of 
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its brief that a finding in Nelson's favor would mean that the 
State "may have to assume that an SSI applicant is also a recipient 
and thus ineligible for AFDC during the SSI determination 
period..." makes no sense. The problem posed by the State is 
already addressed under current law. 
The concluding line at page 22 that the State's position 
"furthers the Congressional intent to prevent an individual from 
benefitting from both the SSI and AFDC programs simultaneously..." 
reveals the confusion in the State's argument. The line is 
directly contradicted by the State's explanation of DIB and SSI 
benefits earlier in its brief where it declares: 
If an applicant is subsequently determined 
eligible for SSI benefits, the SSA deducts 
from its initial retroactive lump-sump [sic] 
SSI payment an amount equal to the amount of 
AFDC aid received by that individual during 
the determination period. ... The rationale 
for this deduction is to prevent a public 
assistance recipient from benefitting from 
both the SSI and the AFDC program for the same 
period of time. 
Brief of the Appellee, at 11. 
The Secretary's Interpretation of Section 602(a)(24) Is Not 
Entitled to Deference, Since It Arose From a Different Context 
In her opening brief, Nelson pointed out that the Action 
Transmittal relied on by the State as controlling policy did not 
address the peculiar facts of this case. It is an informally 
created policy intended to address the issue addressed in 
Pennsylvania v. United States. i.e., whether the federal government 
could recoup all AFDC payments made to someone found eligible for 
SSI benefits. It does not address the situation considered herein 
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that arises when a DIB check is arbitrarily issued before a 
retroactive SSI check. The State does not address that point but 
argues, instead, that the court should defer without further 
consideration to what the State regards as binding policy. 
The State does acknowledge that a reviewing court need not 
defer to an agency interpretation it finds unreasonable. Having 
said that, the State then declines to grapple with whether its 
policy produced a reasonable result in Nelson's case. The 
appellant submits that it did not. While the Social Security Act 
may be "among the most intricate ever drafted by Congress," its 
complexity is not an excuse for the State to avoid the unfairness 
of its policy. 
CONCLUSION 
Nelson presents to the court a rare case where circumstances 
beyond her control resulted in her son losing both financial and 
medical benefits for a year. She does not argue with Congress over 
the wisdom of the lump sum policy, which often catches AFDC mothers 
unaware. She simply urges that the State has not offered a 
persuasive argument for reading 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(24) in a way 
that arbitrarily places her son in a worse position than other 
similarly situated dependent children. 
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